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Abstract
A secure timeline is a tamper-evident historic record
of the states through which a system goes throughout
its operational history. Secure timelines can help us
reason about the temporal ordering of system states
in a provable manner. We extend secure timelines to
encompass multiple, mutually distrustful services, us-
ing timeline entanglement. Timeline entanglement as-
sociates disparate timelines maintained at independent
systems, by linking undeniably the past of one timeline
to the future of another. Timeline entanglement is a
sound method to map a time step in the history of one
service onto the timeline of another, and helps clients
of entangled services to get persistent temporal proofs
for services rendered that survive the demise or non-
cooperation of the originating service. In this paper we
present the design and implementation of Timeweave,
our service development framework for timeline entan-
glement based on two novel disk-based authenticated
data structures. We evaluate Timeweave's performance
characteristics and show that it can be eciently de-
ployed in a loosely-coupled distributed system of sev-
eral hundred nodes with overhead of roughly 2-8% of
the processing resources of a PC-grade system.
1
1 Introduction
A large portion of the functionality oered by cur-
rent commercial \secure" or \trusted" on-line ser-
vices focuses on the here and now: certication au-
thorities certify that a public signature verication
key belongs to a named signer, secure le systems
vouch that the le with which they answer a lookup
query is the one originally stored, and trusted third
parties guarantee that they do whatever they are
trusted to do when they do it.
The concept of history has received consider-
ably less attention in systems and security research.
What did the certication authority certify a year
1Appears in the Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security
Symposium, San Francisco, CA, USA. August 2002
ago, and which le did the secure le system return
to a given query last week?
Interest in such questions is fueled by more than
just curiosity. Consider a scenario where Alice,
a certied accountant, consults condential docu-
ments supplied by a business manager at client com-
pany Norne, Inc. so as to prepare a nancial re-
port on behalf of the company for the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). If, in the future,
the SEC questions Alice's integrity, accusing her of
having used old, obsolete nancial information to
prepare her report, Alice might have to prove to
the SEC exactly what information she had received
from Norne, Inc. before preparing her report. To
do that, she would have to rely on authentic his-
toric data about documents and communication ex-
changes between herself and Norne, on the authen-
tic, relative and absolute timing of those exchanges,
perhaps even on the contents of the business agree-
ment between herself and the company at the time.
Especially if the company maliciously chooses to
tamper with or even erase its local records to repudi-
ate potential transgressions, Alice would be able to
redeem herself only by providing undeniable proof
that at the time in question, Norne, Inc. did in fact
present her with the documents it now denies.
Besides this basic problem, many other periph-
eral problems lurk: what if Norne, Inc. no longer
exists when Alice has to account for her actions?
What if Alice and the SEC belong to dierent trust
domains, i.e., have dierent certication authorities
or dierent secure time stamping services?
In this work we formulate the concept of secure
timelines based on traditional time stamping [5, 11]
and authenticated dictionaries [8, 10] (Section 3).
Secure timelines allow the maintenance of a persis-
tent, authenticated record of the sequence of states
that an accountable service takes during its lifetime.
Furthermore, we describe a technique called time-2
line entanglement for building a single, common
tamper-evident history for multiple mutually dis-
trustful entities (Section 4). First, timeline entan-
glement enables the temporal correlation of inde-
pendent histories, thereby yielding a single timeline
that encompasses events on independent systems.
This correlation can be veried independently in the
trust domain of each participant, albeit with some
loss of temporal resolution. Second, it allows clients
to preserve the provability of temporal relationships
among system states, even when the systems whose
states are in question no longer participate in the
collective, or are no longer in existence.
We then present Timeweave, our prototype
framework for the development of loosely-coupled
distributed systems of accountable services that
uses timeline entanglement to protect historic in-
tegrity (Section 5). We describe novel, scalable al-
gorithms to maintain secure timelines for extended
time periods and for very large data collections. Fi-
nally, we evaluate the performance characteristics of
Timeweave in Section 6 and show that it eciently
supports large-sized groups of frequently entangled
services|up to several hundred|with maintenance
overhead that does not surpass 2-8% of the compu-
tational resources of a PC-grade server.
2 Background
In this work we draw on results from research on se-
cure time stamping and authenticated dictionaries.
The main inspiration behind our approach comes
from Lamport's classic logical clock paradigm [14].
2.1 Secure Time Stamping
In secure time stamping, it is the responsibility of
a centralized, trusted third party, the Time Stamp-
ing Service (TSS), to maintain a temporal ordering
of submission among digital documents. As doc-
uments or document digests are submitted to it,
the TSS links them in a tamper-evident chain of
authenticators, using a one-way hash function, and
distributes portions of the chain and of the authenti-
cators to its clients. Given the last authenticator in
the chain it is impossible for anyone, including the
TSS, to insert a document previously unseen in the
middle of the chain unobserved, without signicant
collusion, and without nding a second pre-image
for the hash function used [11].
Benaloh and de Mare [5] describe synchronous,
broadcast-based time stamping schemes where no
central TSS is required, and introduce the concept
of a time stamping round. All documents time
stamped during a round are organized in a data
structure, at or hierarchical, and yield a collec-
tive digest that can be used to represent all the
documents of the entire round, in a tamper-evident
manner; given the digest, the existence of exactly
the documents inside the data structure can be
proved succinctly, and any document outside the
data structure can be proved not to be there.
Buldas et al. [8] extend previous work by signi-
cantly diminishing the need to trust the TSS. They
also introduce ecient schemes for maintaining rela-
tive temporal orderings of digital artifacts with log-
arithmic complexity in the total number of artifacts.
A large, concurrent project towards the full speci-
cation of a time stamping service is described by
Quisquater et al. [21].
Ansper et al. [2] discuss time stamping service
availability, and suggest a scheme similar to consen-
sus in a replicated system to allow for fault-tolerant
time stamping.
Finally, Schneier and Kelsey propose a exible
scheme to protect access-controlled ordered logs on
untrusted machines against tampering or unautho-
rized retroactive disclosure [23], based extensively
on hash chaining. They address the problem in an
application setting where historic integrity need be
maintained only for the short-term, until the local
history is uploaded to a trusted server for evaluation
and storage, and where the entities enforcing his-
toric integrity need not be themselves held account-
able, as is the case in many corporate intranets.
2.2 Authenticated Dictionaries
Authenticated dictionaries are data structures that
operate as tamper-evident indices for a dynamic
data set. They help compute and maintain a one-
way digest of the data set, such that using this digest
and a succinct proof, the existence or non-existence
of any element in the set can be proved, without
considering the whole set.
The rst such authenticated dictionary is
Merkle's hash tree [17], originally proposed as a dig-
ital signature scheme. Hash trees are binary trees in
whose leaves the data set elements are placed. Each
leaf node is labeled with the hash of the contained
data element and each interior node is labeled with a
hash of the concatenated labels of its children. The
label of the root node is a tamper-evident digest
for the entire data set. The existence proof for an
element in the tree consists of the necessary infor-
mation to derive the root hash from the element in
question; specically, the proof consists of all labels3
and locations (left or right) of all siblings of nodes
on the path from the element to the tree root.
Tree-based authenticated dictionaries reminiscent
of Merkle's hash trees are most notably proposed
for the distribution of certicate revocation records,
rst by Kocher [13], and then in an incrementally
updatable version by Naor and Nissim [18]. Buldas
et al. obviate the need for trusting the dictionary
maintainer to keep the dictionary sorted, by intro-
ducing the authenticated search tree [6, 7]. Authen-
ticated search trees are like hash trees, but all nodes,
leaves and internal nodes alike, contain data set el-
ements. The label of the node is a hash not only of
the labels of its children, but also of the element of
the node. Existence proofs contain node elements in
addition to nodes' siblings' labels on the path from
the element in question to the root. In this manner,
an existence proof follows the same path that the
tree maintainer must take to nd a sought element;
as a result, clients need not unconditionally trust
that the tree maintainer keeps the tree sorted, since
given a root hash, there is a unique descent path
that follows the standard traversal of search trees
towards any single element.
Authenticated dictionaries have also been pro-
posed based on dierent data structures. Buldas
et al. [8] describe several tree-like \binary linking
schemes." Goodrich et al. [10] propose an authenti-
cated skip list that relies on commutative hashing.
In the recent literature, the maintenance of au-
thenticated but persistent dynamic sets [9, p. 294]
has received some attention. Persistent dynamic
sets allow modications of the elements in the
set, but maintain enough information to recreate
any prior version of the set. Anagnostopoulos et
al. [1] propose and implement persistent authenti-
cated skip lists, where not only older versions of the
skip list are available, but they are each, by them-
selves, an authenticated dictionary. In the same
work, and also in work by Maniatis and Baker [16],
persistent authenticated dictionaries based on red-
black trees are sketched in some detail, although the
resulting designs are dierent. Specically, in the
former work, although multiple versions of the au-
thenticated red-black tree are maintained, the col-
lection of versions is itself not authenticated; the
latter work uses a second, non-persistent authenti-
cated dictionary to authenticate the tree versions.
3 Secure Timelines
We dene a secure timeline within a service domain.
A service domain comprises a system oering a par-
ticular service|the service of the domain|and a
set of clients who use that system for that service|
the clients of the domain. Such a service domain
could be, for example, the le server and all clients
of a secure le system, or an enterprise-wide certi-
cation authority along with all certicate subjects
within that enterprise.
Within the context of a service domain, a secure
timeline is a tamper-evident, temporally-ordered,
append-only sequence of the states taken by the ser-
vice of that domain. In a sense, a secure timeline
denes an authenticated logical clock for the service.
Each time step of the clock is annotated with the
state in which the service is at the time, and an au-
thenticator. The authenticator is tamper-evident:
given the authenticator of the latest time step of
the timeline, it is intractable for the service or for
any other polynomially-bound party to \change his-
tory" unobtrusively by altering the annotations or
authenticators of past time steps.
In this work, we consider secure timelines based
on one-way (second pre-image-resistant) hash func-
tions. Assuming, as is common, that one-way hash
functions exist, we use such functions to dene the
\arrow of time." In other words, given a presum-
ably one-way hash function h such as SHA-1 [19], if
b = h(a), then we conclude that value a was known
before value b, or a temporally precedes b, since given
b the probability of guessing the right a is negligible.
A simple recursive way to dene a secure time-
line is as follows: if at logical time i the clock has
authenticator Ti, then at the next logical time step
i + 1, the hash function h is applied to the pre-
vious clock authenticator Ti and to the next state
of the system Si+1. Assuming that f is a one-way
digest function from system states to digests, then
Ti+1 = h(i + 1kTikf(Si+1)), where k denotes con-
catenation. Given Ti+1, it is intractable to produce
appropriate  such that Ti+1 = h(i + 1kTi
0k), so
as to make an arbitrary authenticator Ti
0 6= Ti ap-
pear as the timeline authenticator of logical step i,
from the second pre-image resistance of the hash
function. Similarly, for a given Ti+1 only a unique
state digest di+1 = f(Si+1) is probable, and, from
the one-way property of the state digest function f,
only a unique system state Si+1 is probable. There-
fore, authenticator Ti+1 is, in a sense, a one-way
digest of all preceding authenticators and system
states, as well as of their total temporal ordering.
Many existing accountable services match the se-
cure timeline paradigm, since secure timelines are
a generalization of secure time stamping services
(TSS) [11]. The service state of a TSS is an au-
thenticated dictionary of all document digests sub-4
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Figure 1: The rst few steps of a secure timeline. Time
ows from left to right. Note that the current authen-
ticator of the timeline is an input to the next state of
the system. We explain one way to accomplish this in
Section 5.2.
mitted to it during a time stamping round. The Key
Archival Service (KAS) by Maniatis and Baker [16]
is another service with a timeline, where the ser-
vice state is a persistent authenticated dictionary of
all certicates and revocation records issued by a
Certication Authority. Similarly, any service that
maintains one-way digests of its current state can
be retrotted to have a secure timeline. Consider,
for example, Kocher's Certicate Revocation Trees
(CRT) [13]. The state of the service at the end of
each publication interval consists of a hash tree of
all published revocation records. The root hash of
the CRT is a one-way digest of the database. Conse-
quently, a secure timeline for the revocation service
can easily follow from the above construction.
Figure 1 illustrates the rst few time steps of a
secure timeline. In the gure, the new timeline
authenticator is also fed into the new state of the
system. Depending on the denition of the state
digest function, a new state of the service can be
shown to be fresh, i.e., to have followed the com-
putation of the authenticator for the previous time
step. In Time Stamping Services, this places the
time stamp of a document between two rounds of
the service. In the Key Archival Service, this bounds
the time interval during which a change in the Cer-
tication Authority (new certicate, revocation, or
refresh) has occurred. In a CRT timeline system,
this bounds the time when a revocation database
was built. Some authenticated dictionaries can be
shown to be fresh(e.g., [8]), and we explain how we
handle freshness in Section 5.2.
Secure timelines can be used to answer two basic
kinds of questions: existence questions and temporal
precedence questions. Existence questions are of the
form \is S the i-th system state?", and are used to
establish that the service exhibited a certain kind of
behavior at a particular phase in its history. In the
time stamping example, an existence question could
be \is d the round hash at time i?" A positive an-
swer allows a client to verify the validity of a time
stamp from round i, since time stamps from round i
are authenticated with the root hash of that round.
Temporal precedence questions are of the form \did
state S occur before state S0?". In time stamping,
answers to precedence questions can establish prece-
dence between two time stamped documents.
Answers to both existence and temporal prece-
dence questions are provable. Given the last au-
thenticator in the timeline, to prove the existence
of a state in the timeline's past I have to produce
a one-way path|a sequence of applications of one-
way functions|from that state to the current time-
line authenticator. Similarly, to prove that state S
precedes state S0, I have to show that there exists
a one-way path from state S to state S0. For ex-
ample, in Figure 1, the path from S1 to T1, T2 and
then to S3 is one-way and establishes that state S1
occurred before S3. Extending this path to T3 pro-
vides an existence proof for state S1, if the verier
knows that T3 is the latest timeline authenticator.
Secure timelines are a general mechanism for tem-
poral authentication. As with any other authentica-
tion mechanism, timeline proofs are useful only if
the authenticator against which they are validated
is itself secure and easily accessible to all veriers,
i.e., the clients within the service domain. In other
words, clients must be able to receive securely au-
thenticator tuples of the form hi;Tii from the ser-
vice at every time step, or at coarser intervals. This
assumes that clients have a means to open authen-
ticated channels to the service. Furthermore, there
must be a unique tuple for every time step i. Ei-
ther the service must be trusted by the clients to
maintain a unique timeline, or the timeline must
be periodically \anchored" on an unconditionally
trusted write-once publication medium, such as a
paper journal or popular newspaper. The latter
technique is used by some commercial time stamp-
ing services [25], to reduce the clients' need to trust
the service.
For the remainder of this paper, \time i" means
the state of the service that is current right before
timeline element i has been published, as well as
the physical time period between the publication
of the timeline authenticators for time steps i   1
and i. For service A, we denote time i as hA;ii,
the associated timeline authenticator as T A
i and the
precedence proof from i to j as P
A;j
A;i .5
4 Timeline Entanglement
In the previous section, we describe how a secure
timeline can be used by the clients within a service
domain to reason about the temporal ordering of
the states of the service in a provable manner. In
so doing, the clients of the service have access to
tamper-evident historic information about the op-
eration of the service in the past.
However, the timeline of service A does not carry
much conviction before a client who belongs to a dif-
ferent, disjoint service domain B, i.e., a client who
does not trust service A or the means by which it is
held accountable. Consider an example from time
stamping where Alice, a client of TSS A, wishes to
know when Bob, a client of another TSS B, time
stamped a particular document D. A time stamp-
ing proof that links D to an authenticator in B's
timeline only is not convincing or useful to Alice,
since she has no way to compare temporally time
steps in B's timeline to her own timeline, held by
A.
This is the void that timeline entanglement lls.
Timeline entanglement creates a provable temporal
precedence from a time step in a secure timeline to
a time step in another independent timeline. Its
objective is to allow a group of mutually distrustful
service domains to collaborate towards maintaining
a common, tamper-evident history of their collective
timelines that can be veried from the point of view
(i.e., within the trust domain) of any one of the
participants.
In timeline entanglement, each participating ser-
vice domain maintains its own secure timeline, but
also keeps track of the timelines of other partici-
pants, by incorporating authenticators from those
foreign timelines into its own service state, and
therefore its own timeline. In a sense, all partici-
pants enforce the commitment of the timeline au-
thenticators of their peers.
In Section 4.1, we dene timeline entanglement
with illustrative examples and outline its properties.
We then explore in detail three aspects of timeline
entanglement: Secure Temporal Mappings in Sec-
tion 4.2, the implications of dishonest timeline main-
tainers in Section 4.3, and Historic Survivability in
Section 4.4.
4.1 Fundamentals
Timeline entanglement is dened within the context
of an entangled service set. This is a dynamically
changing set of service domains. Although an entan-
gled service set where all participating domains oer
the same kind of service is conceivable|such as, for
example, a set of time stamping services|we envi-
sion many dierent service types, time stamping ser-
vices, certication authorities, historic records ser-
vices, etc., participating in the same entangled set.
We assume that all participating services know the
current membership of the entangled service set, al-
though inconsistencies in this knowledge among ser-
vices does not hurt the security of our constructs
below. We also assume that members of the service
set can identify and authenticate each other, either
through the use of a common public key infrastruc-
ture, or through direct out-of-band key exchanges.
Every participating service denes an indepen-
dent sampling method to select a relatively small
subset of its logical time steps for entanglement. For
example, a participant can choose to entangle every
n-th time step. At every time step picked for en-
tanglement, the participant sends an authenticated
message that contains its signed logical time and
timeline authenticator to all other participants in
the entangled service set. This message is called
a timeline thread. A timeline thread sent from A
at time hA;ii is denoted as tA
i and has the form
[A;i;T A
i ;AfA;i;T A
i g]. AfXg represents A's sig-
nature on message X.
When participant B receives a correctly signed
timeline thread from participant A, it veries the
consistency of that thread with its local view of
collective history and then archives it. Thread tA
i
is consistent with B's local view of collective his-
tory if it can be proved to be on the same one-way
path (hash chain) as the last timeline authenticator
of A that B knows about (see Figure 2). Towards
this goal, A includes the necessary temporal prece-
dence proof, as described in Section 3, along with
the thread that it sends to B. In the gure, when
thread tA
i reaches B, the most recent timeline au-
thenticator of A that B knows is T A
l . Along with the
thread, A sends the precedence proof P
A;i
A;l from its
time hA;li to time hA;ii. As a result, B can verify
that the new thread carries a \legitimate" timeline
authenticator from A, one consistent with history.
If everything checks out, B archives the new time-
line authenticator and associated precedence proof
in its local thread archive.
Thread archives store tuples of the form
[tA
i ;P
A;i
A;l ]. A thread archive serves two purposes:
rst, it maintains a participant's local knowledge of
the history of the entangled service set. Specically,
it archives proof that every participant it knows
about maintains a consistent timeline. It accom-
plishes this by simply storing the threads, which are
snapshots in the sender's timeline, and supporting6
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Figure 2: Entanglement exchanges between partici-
pants A and B. The workings of B are shown in detail.
We show two entanglement exchanges, one of time hB;ki
with time hA;li, and one of time hA;ii with time hB;ji.
Thick black horizontal arrows show timeline thread mes-
sages. Thin black horizontal arrows show entanglement
receipt messages. Vertical black arrows show one-way
operations. The thick shadowed arrow shows the tem-
poral ordering eected by thread t
A
i and its receipt r
B;j
A;i .
precedence proofs, which connect these snapshots in
a single one-way chain. The second purpose of the
thread archive is to maintain temporal precedence
proofs between every foreign thread it contains and
local timeline steps. It accomplishes this by con-
structing a one-way digest of its contents as they
change, and then using that digest along with the
system state digest, to derive the next local timeline
authenticator (Section 5.2 describes how the thread
archive is implemented). In the gure, B's system
state SB
j and updated thread archive EB
j are com-
bined into dB
j , which then participates in the com-
putation of the next timeline authenticator T B
j .
Participant B responds to the newly reported
timeline authenticator with an entanglement receipt.
This receipt proves that the next timeline authen-
ticator that B produces is inuenced partly by the
archiving of the thread it just received. The re-
ceipt must convince A of three things: rst, that its
thread was archived; second, that the thread was
archived in the latest|\freshest"|version of B's
thread archive; and, third, that this version of the
thread archive is the one whose digest is used to
derive the next timeline authenticator that B pro-
duces. As a result, the entanglement receipt r
B;j
A;i
that B returns to A for the entanglement of thread
tA
i consists of three components: rst, a precedence
proof P
B;j 1
B;k from the last of B's timeline authen-
ticators that A knows about, T B
k , to B's timeline
authenticator T B
j 1 right before archiving A's new
thread; second, an existence proof showing that the
timeline thread tA
i is archived in the latest, fresh-
est version EB
j of B's thread archive after the last
authenticator T B
j 1 was computed; and, third, a one-
way derivation of the next timeline authenticator of
B from the new version of the thread archive and
the current system state SB
j . It is now A's turn to
check the validity of the proofs in the entanglement
receipt. If all goes well, A stores the proof of prece-
dence and reported timeline authenticator from B
in its receipt archive. This concludes the entangle-
ment process from time hA;ii to time hB;ji.
The receipt archive is similar to the thread
archive; it stores entanglement receipts that the
participant receives in response to its own timeline
threads.
After the entanglement of time hA;ii with time
hB;ji, both A and B have in their possession
portable temporal precedence proofs ordering A's
past before B's future. Any one-way process at A
whose result is included in the derivation of T A
i or
earlier timeline authenticators at A can be shown
to have completed before any one-way process at
B that includes in its inputs T B
j or later timeline
authenticators at B.
In this denition of timeline entanglement, a par-
ticipating service entangles its timeline at the prede-
termined sample time steps with all other services
in the entangled service set (we call this all-to-all
entanglement). In this work we limit the discus-
sion to all-to-all entanglement only, but we describe
a more restricted, and consequently less expensive,
entanglement model in future work (Section 7).
The primary benet of timeline entanglement is
its support for secure temporal mapping. A client
in one service domain can use temporal information
maintained in a remote service domain that he does
not trust, by mapping that information onto his own
service domain. This mapping results in some loss
of temporal resolution|for example, a time instant
maps to a positive-length time interval. We describe
secure temporal mapping in Section 4.2.
Timeline entanglement is a sound method of ex-
panding temporal precedence proofs outside a ser-7
vice domain; it does not prove incorrect prece-
dences. However it is not complete, that is, there
are some precedences it cannot prove. For exam-
ple, it is possible for a dishonest service to maintain
clandestinely two timelines, essentially \hiding" the
commitment of some of its system states from some
members of the entangled service set. We explore
the implications of such behavior in Section 4.3.
Finally, we consider the survivability characteris-
tics of temporal proofs beyond the lifetime of the
associated timeline, in Section 4.4.
4.2 Secure Temporal Mapping
Temporal mapping allows a participating service A
to map onto its own timeline a time step hB;ii from
the timeline of another participant B. This mapping
is denoted by hB;ii 7! A. Since A and B do not
trust each other, the mapping must be secure; this
means it should be practically impossible for B to
prove to A that (hB;ii 7! A) = (hA;ji;hA;ki], if
hB;ii occurred before or at hA;ji, or after hA;ki.
Figure 3 illustrates the secure temporal mapping
hB;2i 7! A. To compute the mapping, A requires
only local information from its thread and receipt
archives. First, it searches in its receipt archive for
the latest entanglement receipt that B sent back
before or at time hB;2i, receipt r
B;1
A;1 in the example.
As described in Section 4, this receipt proves to A
that its time hA;1i occurred before B's time hB;1i.
Then, A searches in its thread archive for the ear-
liest thread that B sent it after time hB;2i, which is
thread tB
3 in the example. This thread proves to A
that its time hA;5i occurred at or after time hB;3i.
Recall, also, that when A received tB
3 in the rst
place, it had also received a temporal precedence
proof from hB;1i to hB;3i, which in the straightfor-
ward hash chain case, also includes the system state
digest for hB;2i. Now A has enough information to
conclude that (hB;2i 7! A) = (hA;1i;hA;5i].
Since A has no reason to believe that B maintains
its timeline in regular intervals, there is no more
that A can assume about the temporal placement
of state SB
2 within the interval (hA;1i;hA;5i]. This
results in a loss of temporal resolution; in the gure,
this loss is illustrated as the dierence between the
length on B's timeline from hB;1i to hB;2i (i.e., the
\duration" of time step hB;2i) and the length of the
segment on A's timeline from hA;1i to hA;5i (the
duration of hB;2i 7! A). This loss is higher when
A and B exchange thread messages infrequently. It
can be made lower, but only at the cost of increasing
the frequency with which A and B send threads to
each other, which translates to more messages and
B
t
3
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
A B
￿ > < 2 ,
A
t
1
￿
￿
1
,
1
,
B
A
r
Figure 3: Secure mapping of time hB;2i onto the time-
line of A. Thick arrows indicate timeline threads. Thin
arrows indicate entanglement receipts (only the relevant
entanglement receipts are shown). Irrelevant thread and
receipt messages are grayed-out. The dark broken line
illustrates the progression of values that secure the cor-
rectness of the mapping.
more computation at A and B. We explore this
trade-o in Section 6.
Secure time mapping allows clients within a ser-
vice domain to determine with certainty the tempo-
ral ordering between states on their own service and
on remote, untrusted service domains. Going back
to the time stamping example, assume that Alice
has in her possession a time stamp for document C
in her own service domain A, which links it to local
time hA;7i, and she has been presented by Bob with
a time stamp on document D in his service domain
B, which links Bob's document to time hB;2i. Alice
can request from A the time mapping hB;2i 7! A,
shown above to be (hA;1i;hA;5i]. With this infor-
mation, Alice can be convinced that her document
C was time stamped after Bob's document D was,
regardless of whether or not Alice trusts Bob or B.
In the general case, not all time steps in one time-
line map readily to another timeline. To reduce the
length of temporal precedence proofs, we use hash
skip lists (Section 5.1) instead of straightforward
hash chains in Timeweave, our prototype. Tempo-
ral precedence proofs on skip lists are shorter be-
cause they do not contain every timeline authenti-
cator from the source to the destination. In time-
lines implemented in this manner, only time steps
included in the skip list proof can be mapped with-
out the cooperation of the remote service. For other
mappings, the remote service must supply addi-
tional, more detailed precedence proofs, connecting
the time authenticator in question to the time au-
thenticators that the requester knows about.8
4.3 Historic Integrity
Timeline entanglement is intended as an articial
enlargement of the class of usable, temporal order-
ings that clients within a service domain can deter-
mine undeniably. Without entanglement, a client
can determine the provable ordering of events only
on the local timeline. With entanglement, one-way
paths are created that anchor time segments from
remote, untrusted timelines onto the local timeline.
However, the one-way properties of the digest and
hash functions used make timelines secure only as
long as everybody is referring to the same, single
timeline. If, instead, a dishonest service maintains
clandestinely two or more timelines or branches of
the same timeline, publishing dierent timeline au-
thenticators to dierent subsets of its users, then
that service can, in a sense, revise history. Just [12]
identied such an attack against early time stamp-
ing services. Within a service domain, this attack
can be foiled by enforcing that the service period-
ically commit its timeline on a write-once, widely
published medium, such as a local newspaper or pa-
per journal. When there is doubt, a cautious client
can wait to see the precedence proof linking the
timeline authenticator of interest to the next widely
published authenticator, before considering the for-
mer unique.
Unfortunately, a similar attack can be mounted
against the integrity of collective history, in an en-
tangled service set. Entanglement, as described in
Section 4, does not verify that samples from B's
timeline that are archived at A and C are identi-
cal. If B is malicious, it can report authenticators
from one chain to A and from another to C, unde-
tected (see Figure 4). In the general case, this does
not dilute the usability of entanglement among hon-
est service domains. Instead, it renders unprovable
some interactions between honest and dishonest ser-
vice domains. More importantly, attacks by a ser-
vice against the integrity of its own timeline can
only make external temporal precedence informa-
tion involving that timeline inconclusive; such at-
tacks cannot change the temporal ordering between
time steps on honest and dishonest timelines. Ulti-
mately, it is solely the clients of a dishonest service
who suer the consequences.
Consider, for instance, the scenario of Figure 4.
Dishonest service B has branched o its originally
unique timeline into two separate timelines at its
time hB;2i. It uses the top branch, with times 30,
40, etc., in its entanglements with service C, and its
bottom branch, with times 3, 4, etc., in its entangle-
ments with service A. From A's point of view, event
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Figure 4: An example showing a dishonest service B
that maintains two timelines, entangling one with A and
another with C. Event N is committed on the bottom
branch of B's timeline, but does not appear on the top
branch.
N is incorporated in B's state and corresponding
timeline at time hB;4i. From C's point of view,
however, event N seems never to have happened.
Since N does not appear in the branch of B's time-
line that is visible to C, C's clients cannot conclu-
sively place event N in time at all. Therefore, only
the client of B who is responsible for event N suf-
fers from this discrepancy. C does not know about
it at all, and A knows its correct relative temporal
position.
We describe briey a method for enforcing time-
line uniqueness within an entangled service set in
Section 7.
4.4 Historic Survivability
Historic survivability in the context of an entangled
set of services is the decoupling of the veriability
of existence and temporal precedence proofs within
a timeline from the fate of the maintainer of that
timeline.
Temporal proofs are inherently survivable be-
cause of their dependence on well-known, one-way
constructs. For example, a hash chain consisting
of multiple applications of SHA-1 certainly proves
that the result of the chain temporally followed the
input to the chain. However, this survivability is
moot, if the timeline authenticators that the proof
orders undeniably can no longer be interpreted or
associated with a real time frame.
Fortunately, secure temporal mapping allows a
client within a service domain to fortify a temporal
proof that he cares about against the passing of the
local service. The client can accomplish this by par-
ticipating in more service domains than one; then,9
he can proactively map the temporal proofs he cares
about from their source timeline onto all the time-
lines of the service domains in which he belongs. In
this manner, even if all but one of the services with
which he is associated become unavailable or go out
of business, the client may still associate his proofs
with a live timeline in the surviving service domain.
Consider, for example, the scenario illustrated in
Figure 5. David, who belongs to all three service
domains A, B and C, wishes to fortify event N so
as to be able to place it in time, even if service
B is no longer available. He maps the event onto
the timelines of A and C|\mapping an event N"
is equivalent to mapping the timeline time step in
whose system state event N is included, that is,
hB;2i in the example. Even though the event oc-
curred in B's timeline, David can still reason about
its relative position in time, albeit with some loss
of resolution, in both the service domains of A and
C, long after B is gone. In a sense, David \hedges
his bets" among multiple services, hoping that one
of them survives. Note also that the fortication
of even N can occur long after its occurrence. The
use of temporal mapping in this context is similar
in scope to the techniques used by Ansper et al. [2]
for fault-tolerant time stamping services, although
it assumes far less mutual trust among the dierent
service domains.
5 Implementation
We have devised two new, to our knowledge, disk-
oriented data structures for the implementation of
Timeweave, our timeline entanglement prototype.
In Section 5.1, we present authenticated append-
only skip lists. These are an ecient optimization of
traditional hash chains and yield precedence proofs
with size proportional to the square logarithm of
the total elements in the list, as opposed to linear.
In Section 5.2, we present RBB-Trees, our disk-
based, persistent authenticated dictionaries based
on authenticated search trees. RBB-Trees scale to
larger sizes than current in-memory persistent au-
thenticated dictionaries, while making ecient use
of the disk. Finally, in Section 5.3, we outline how
Timeweave operates.
5.1 Authenticated Append-only Skip
Lists
Our basic tool for maintaining an ecient secure
timeline is the authenticated append-only skip list.
The authenticated append-only skip list is a mod-
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Figure 5: An example of mapping event N onto two
other timelines, to obtain a survivable proof of its tem-
poral position. The top shaded line represents (N 7! C)
and the bottom shaded line represents (N 7! A).
ication of the simplistic hash chain described in
Section 3 that yields improved access characteris-
tics and shorter proofs.
Our skip lists are deterministic, as opposed to the
randomized skip lists proposed in the literature [20].
Unlike the authenticated skip lists introduced by
Goodrich et al. [10], our skip lists are append-only,
which obviates the need for commutative hashing.
Every list element has a numeric identier that is a
counter from the rst element in the list (the rst
element is element 1, the tenth element is element
10, and so on); the initial authenticator of the skip
list before any elements are inserted is element 0.
Every inserted element carries a data value and an
authenticator, similarly to what was suggested in
Section 3 for single-chain timelines.
The skip list consists of multiple parallel hash
chains at dierent levels of detail, each containing
half as many elements as the previous one. The ba-
sic chain (at level 0) links every element to the au-
thenticator of the one before it, just like simple hash
chains. The next chain (at level 1) coexists with
the level 0 chain, but only contains elements whose
numeric identiers are multiples of 2, and every el-
ement is linked to the element two positions before
it. Similarly, only elements with numeric identiers
that are multiples of 2i are contained in the hash
chain of level i. No chains of level j > log2 n are
maintained, if all elements are n.
The authenticator Ti of element i with data value
di is computed from a hash of all the partial authen-
ticators (called links) from each basic hash chain in
which the element participates. Element i = 2lk,
where 2 does not divide k, participates in l + 1
chains. It has the l + 1 links L
j
i = h(i;j;di;Ti 2j),10
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Figure 6: Six consecutive skip list elements, element 16
to element 21. Arrows show hash operations from pre-
vious authenticators to links of an element. The top of
each tower is the resulting authenticator for the element,
derived by hashing together all links underneath it.
0  j  l, and authenticator Ti = h(L0
ik:::kLl
i).
Figure 6 illustrates a portion of such a skip list. In
the implementation, we combine together the ele-
ment authenticator with the 0-th level link for odd-
numbered elements, since such elements have a sin-
gle link, which is sucient as an authenticator by
itself.
Skip lists allow their ecient traversal from an
element i to a later element j in a logarithmic num-
ber of steps: starting from element i, successively
higher-level links are utilized until the \tallest ele-
ment" (one with the largest power of 2 in its fac-
tors among all element indices between i and j) is
reached. Thereafter, successively lower-level links
are traversed until j is reached. More specically,
an iterative process starts with the current element
c = i. To move closer to the destination element
with index j, the highest power 2z of 2 that divides
c is picked, such that c + 2z  j. Then element
k = c + 2z becomes the next current element c in
the traversal. The iteration stops when c = j.
The associated temporal precedence proof linking
element i before element j is constructed in a man-
ner similar to the traversal described above. At ev-
ery step, when a jump of length 2z is taken from the
current element c to k = c+2z, the element value of
the new element dk is appended to the proof, along
with all the associated links of element k, except for
the link at level z. Link Lz
k is omitted since it can
be computed during verication from the previous
authenticator Tc and the data value dk.
In the example of Figure 6, the path from el-
ement 17 to element 21 traverses elements 18
and 20. The corresponding precedence proof
from element 17 to element 21 is P 21
17 =
fd18;L1
18;d20;L0
20;L2
20;d21g. With this proof and
given the authenticators T17 and T21 of elements
17 and 21 respectively, the verier can succes-
sively compute T 0
18 = h(h(18k0kd18kT17)kL1
18),
then T 0
20 = h(L0
20kh(20k1kd20kT 0
18)kL2
20) and nally
T 0
21 = h(21k0kd21kT 0
20)|recall that for all odd ele-
ments i, Ti = L0
i. If the known and the derived
values for the authenticator agree (T21 = T 0
21), then
the verier can be convinced that the authenticator
T17 preceded the computation of authenticator T21,
which is the objective of a precedence proof.
Thanks to the properties of skip lists, any of these
proofs contains links and data values of roughly a
logarithmic number of skip list elements. The worst-
case proof for a skip list of n elements traverses
2log2(n) elements, climbing links of every level be-
tween 0 and log2(n) and back down again, or log
2
2(n)
link values and log2(n) data values total. Assuming
that every link and value is a SHA-1 digest of 160
bits, the worst case proof for a timeline of a billion
elements is no longer than 20 KBytes, and most are
much shorter.
Our skip lists are t for secondary storage. They
are implemented on memory-mapped les. Since
modications are expected to be relatively rare,
compared to searches and proof extractions, we al-
ways write changes to the skip list through to the
disk immediately after they are made, to maintain
consistency in the face of machine crashes. We do
not, however, support structural recovery from disk
crashes; we believe that existing le system and re-
dundant disk arraytechnologies are adequate to pre-
vent and recover all but the most catastrophic losses
of disk bits.
5.2 Disk-based Persistent Authenti-
cated Dictionaries
This work uses authenticated persistent dictionaries
based on trees. A persistent dictionary maintains
multiple versions (or snapshots) of its contents as
it is modied. In addition to the functionality of-
fered by simple authenticated dictionaries, it can
also provably answer questions of the form \in snap-
shot t, was element d in the dictionary?".
The dictionaries we use in this work can poten-
tially grow very large, much larger than the sizes
of current main memories. Therefore, we have ex-
tended our earlier work on balanced persistent au-
thenticated search trees [16] to design on-disk per-
sistent authenticated dictionaries. The resulting
data structure, the RBB-Tree, is a binary authen-
ticated search tree [6, 7] embedded in a persistent
B-Tree [4][9, Ch. 18]. Figure 7 shows a simple RBB-
Tree holding 16 numeric keys.11
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Figure 7: An RBB-Tree. Boxes are disk blocks. In this
example, each non-root disk block contains a minimum
of 1 and a maximum of 3 keys. The authentication labels
of the embedded binary tree nodes are not shown; the
label of any key node is the hash of the label of its left
child, its own key, and the label of its right child, as
in [6, 7]. We do not show the \color" attribute of the
keys in the per-node red-black trees, since they have no
bearing in our discussion.
RBB-Trees, like B-Trees, are designed to organize
keys together in ecient structures that result in few
disk accesses per tree operation. Every tree node is
stored in its own disk block, contains a minimum of
r 1 and a maximum of 2r 1 keys, and has between
r and 2r children (the root node is only required to
have between 1 and 2r 1 keys). Parameter r is the
order of the B-Tree.
Unlike traditional B-Trees, RBB-Tree nodes do
not store their keys in a at array. Instead, keys
within RBB nodes are organized in a balanced bi-
nary tree, specically a red-black tree [3][9, Ch. 13].
We consider RBB-Trees \virtual" binary trees, since
the in-node binary trees connected to each other re-
sult in a large, piecewise-red-black tree, encompass-
ing all keys in the entire dictionary.
It is this \virtual" binary tree of keys that is au-
thenticated, in the sense of the authenticated search
trees by Buldas et al. [6, 7]. As such, the security
properties of RBB-Trees are identical to those of au-
thenticated search trees, including the structure of
existence/non-existence proofs.
Since the RBB-Tree is a valid B-Tree, it is e-
cient in the number of disk block accesses it requires
for the basic tree operations of insertion, deletion
and modication. Specically, each of those oper-
ations takes O(logrn) disk accesses, where n is the
total number of keys in the tree. Similarly, since
the internal binary tree in each RBB-Tree node is
balanced, the virtual embedded binary tree is also
loosely balanced, and has height O((logrn)(log2r)),
that is, O(log2n) but with a higher constant factor
than in a real red-black tree. These two collabo-
rating types of balancing applied to the virtual bi-
nary tree|the rst through the blocking of keys in
RBB nodes, and the second through the balancing
of the key nodes inside each RBB node|help keep
the length of the resulting existence/non-existence
proofs also bounded to O(log2n) elements.
The internal key structure imposed on RBB-Tree
nodes does not improve the speed of search through
the tree over the speed of search in an equivalent
B-Tree, but limits the length of existence proofs im-
mensely. The existence proof for a datum inside
an authenticated search tree consists of the search
keys of each node from the sought datum up to
the root, along with the labels of the siblings of
each of the ancestors of the sought datum up to
the root [6]. In a very \bushy" tree, as B-Trees
are designed to be, this would mean proofs con-
taining authentication data from a small number
of individual nodes; unfortunately, each individual
node's authentication data consist of roughly r keys
and r siblings' labels. For example, a straightfor-
wardly implemented authenticated B-Tree storing
a billion SHA-1 digests with r = 100 yields exis-
tence proofs of length dlogr109e (r (160+160))
bits, or roughly 160 KBits. The equivalent red-
black tree yields existence proofs of no more than
2dlog2109e(160+160) bits, or about 18 KBits.
RBB-Trees seek to trade o the low disk access costs
of B-Trees with the short proof lengths of red-black
trees. The equivalent RBB-Tree of one billion SHA-
1 digests yields proofs no longer than
B Tree height
z }| {
dlogr109e 
max red black tree height
z }| {
2  dlog2re 
key and label
z }| {
(160+ 160)
bits or roughly 22 KBits, with disk access costs iden-
tical to those of the equivalent B-Tree.
We have designed dynamic set persistence [9, p.
294] at the granularity of both the RBB node and
the embedded key node (see Figure 8). As long
as there is key-node space available within an RBB
node, new snapshots of the key tree within that node
are collocated with older snapshots. This allows
multiple snapshots to share unchanged key nodes
within the same RBB node. When, however, all
available key-node space within an RBB node is ex-
hausted, subsequent snapshots of the key tree inside
that node are migrated to a new, fresh RBB node.
The dierent persistent snapshot roots of the
RBB-Tree are held together in an authenticated
linked list|in fact, we use our own append-only au-
thenticated skip list from Section 5.1.
Since each snapshot of the RBB-Tree is a \vir-
tual" binary authenticated search tree, the root la-12
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Figure 8: A detail from the tree of Figure 7 illustrating
dynamic set persistence. Each key node (circle) indi-
cates the snapshot to which it belongs (small black box).
The subtree below the 12 key node of snapshot 1 is iden-
tical to that of the original tree in Figure 7. Snapshot
2 occurs when key 18 is removed from snapshot 1. As a
result, snapshot 2 has its own key nodes for 12 and 15.
Snapshot 3 occurs when key 19 is inserted into snapshot
2. The RBB node previously holding 14 and 15 has no
more room for key nodes, so a new RBB node is created
to hold the new key nodes 14, 15 and 19 in snapshot
3. At the bottom, the freshness authenticators for each
of the three snapshots are shown. A key node without
children uses the freshness authenticator of its snapshot
when calculating its hash label.
bel of that tree (i.e., the label of the root key node of
the root RBB node) is a one-way digest of the snap-
shot [6, 7]. Furthermore, the authenticated skip list
of those snapshot root labels is itself a one-way di-
gest of the sequence of snapshot roots. As a result,
the label of the last element of the snapshot root
skip list is a one-way digest of the entire history of
operations of the persistent RBB-Tree. The snap-
shot root skip list subsumes the functionality of the
Time Tree in our earlier persistent authenticated
red-black tree design [16].
In some cases the \freshness" of an authenticated
dictionary snapshot has to be provable. For ex-
ample, in our description of secure timelines, we
have specied that the system state must depend
on the authenticator of the previous timeline time
step. When the system state is represented by an
authenticated dictionary, an existence proof within
that dictionary need not only show that a sought el-
ement is part of the dictionary given the dictionary
digest (root hash), but also that the sought element
was added into the dictionary after the authentica-
tor of the previous time step was known.
As with other authenticated dictionaries, we ac-
complish this by making the hash label of NIL point-
ers equal to the \freshness" authenticator, so that
all existence proofs of newly inserted elements|
equivalently, non-existence proofs of newly removed
elements|prove that they happened after the given
freshness authenticator was known. Note that sub-
trees of the RBB-Tree that do not change across
snapshots retain their old freshness authenticators.
This is acceptable, since freshness is only necessary
to prove to a client that a requested modication
was just performed (for example, when we produce
entanglement receipts in Section 4), and is required
only of newly removed or inserted dictionary ele-
ments. In the gure, the label for key node 19 is
derived from the freshness authenticator for snap-
shot 3, since 19 is added into the tree in snapshot
3. This establishes that the tree changed to receive
key 19 after the value of the freshness authenticator
for snapshot 3 was known.
In standalone RBB-Trees, the freshness authenti-
cator is simply the last authenticator in the snap-
shot root list (i.e., the authenticator that resulted
from the insertion of the latest closed snapshot root
into the skip list). In the RBB-Trees that we use
for thread archives in Timeweave (Section 5.3), the
freshness authenticator for snapshot i is exactly the
authenticator of the previous timeline time step
Ti 1.
5.3 Timeweave
Timeweave is an implementation of the timeline en-
tanglement mechanisms described in Section 4. It is
built using our authenticated append-only skip lists
(Section 5.1) and our on-disk persistent authenti-
cated search trees (Section 5.2).
A Timeweave machine maintains four compo-
nents: rst, a service state, which is application
specic, and the one-way digest mechanism thereof;
second, its secure timeline; third, a persistent au-
thenticated archive of timeline threads received;
and, fourth, a simple archive of entanglement re-
ceipts received.
The timeline is stored as an append-only authen-
ticated skip list. The system digest used to derive
the timeline authenticator at every logical time step
is a hash of the concatenation of the service state
digest and the digest of the thread archive after any
incoming and outgoing threads have been recorded.
The thread archive contains threads sent by re-
mote peers and veried locally. Such threads are
contained both in thread messages initiated re-
motely and in entanglement receipts to outgoing
threads. The archived threads are ordered by the
identity of the remote peer in the entanglement op-13
eration, and then by the foreign logical time as-
sociated with the operation. The archive is im-
plemented as an RBB-Tree and has a well-dened
mechanism for calculating its one-way digest, de-
scribed in Section 5.2.
The receipt archive is a simple (not authenti-
cated) repository of thread storage receipts for all
outgoing threads successfully acknowledged by re-
mote peers.
The main operational loop of a Timeweave ma-
chine is as follows:
1. Handle client requests and update system state
digest f(S).
2. Insert all valid, newly obtained timeline threads
into thread archive E and update thread
archive digest g(E).
3. Hash together the digests to produce system
digest d = h(f(S)kg(E)).
4. Append d into the timeline skip list, resulting
in a new timeline authenticator T, and sign the
authenticator.
5. Set the new timeline authenticator as the fresh-
ness authenticator in the next snapshot of
the thread archive and, potentially, of the
application-specic system state.
6. For all incoming timeline threads just archived,
construct and return receipts to thread senders.
7. If it is time to send an outgoing timeline thread,
send one to all peers, and store the receipts in
the thread and receipt archives.
The Timeweave machine also allows clients to
request local temporal mappings of remote logi-
cal times and temporal precedences between local
times.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance char-
acteristics of timeline entanglement. First, in Sec-
tion 6.1, we present measurements from a Java im-
plementation of the Timeweave infrastructure: au-
thenticated append-only skip lists and RBB-Trees.
Then, in Section 6.2, we explore the performance
characteristics of Timeweave as a function of its
basic Timeweave system parameter, entanglement
load.
In all measurements, we use a lightly loaded
dual Pentium III Xeon computer at 1 GHz, with
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Figure 9: Skip list performance. (a) Append time vs.
skip list size. Note that the y axis does not start from
0. \Global average" shows average performance over all
operations; \last average" shows performance during the
last one million operations for a given size. (b) Proof
extraction time vs. proof distance. For each distance,
1,000 proofs from uniformly random starting elements
are averaged.
2 GBytes of main memory, running RedHat Linux
7.2, with the stock 2.4.9-31smp kernel and Sun Mi-
crosystems' JVM 1.3.02. The three disks used in
the experiments are model MAJ3364MP made by
Fujitsu, which oer 10,000 RPMs and 5 ms average
seek time. We use a disk block size of 64 KBytes.
Finally, for signing we use DSA with SHA-1, with a
key size of 1024 bits.
6.1 Data Structure Performance
We measure the raw performance characteristics of
our disk-based authenticated data structures. Since
Timeweave relies heavily on these two data struc-
tures, understanding their performance can help
evaluate the performance limitations of Timeweave.
Figure 9(a) shows the performance of skip list ap-
pends, for skip list sizes ranging from one million to
100 million elements, in increments of one million el-
ements. The gure graphs the time taken by a single
append operation averaged over all operations for a
given size, and averaged over the last one million
operations for a given size. As expected, the time
taken by append operations grows logarithmically
with the size of the skip list, although for practi-
cal skip list sizes, the cost per append operation is
virtually constant.
We also measure the performance of skip list proof
extraction, in Figure 9(b). The gure graphs the
time it takes to extract a precedence proof from a
100-million element skip list for a given distance be-
tween the end-points of the proof (the distance be-
tween elements i and j is j   i elements). We aver-
age over 1,000 uniformly random proof extractions14
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Figure 10: RBB-Tree performance for dierent snap-
shot sizes. Curve labels indicate the number of keys per
snapshot|from 100 keys to one million keys per snap-
shot. (a) Insertion time vs. tree size. (b) Proof extrac-
tion time vs. tree size. The \knee" around 0.8 million
elements is due to the overow of the disk block cache.
Keys per snapshot 100 1K 10K 100K 1M
Tree Size (GB) 18 13 7 2 0.5
Table 1: RBB-Tree size on disk as a function of the
snapshot size used to build it. Sizes shown correspond
to trees with three million keys.
per distance. For small distances, dierent proofs
fall within vastly dierent disk blocks, making proof
extraction performance heavily I/O bound. For
larger distances approaching the entire skip list size,
random proofs have many disk blocks in common,
amortizing I/O overheads and lowering the average
cost.
We continue by evaluating the performance char-
acteristics of RBB-Trees. Figure 10 contains two
graphs, one showing how insertion time grows with
tree size (Figure 10(a)) and another showing how
proof extraction time grows with tree size (Fig-
ure 10(b)).
Smaller snapshot sizes have two eects: more disk
blocks for the same number of elements and more
hashing. The number of disk blocks used is higher
because some keys are replicated across more snap-
shots; the amount of hashing is higher since every
new copy of a key node must have a new hash la-
bel calculated. The rst eect is evidenced in Ta-
ble 1, which shows the disk size of a three-million-
key RBB-Tree with varying snapshot sizes. The sec-
ond eect is evidenced in Figure 10(a), plotting in-
sertion times for dierent snapshot sizes.
Proof extraction experiments consisted of 1,000
random searches for every size increment. This op-
eration, which consists of a tree traversal from the
root of the tree to a leaf, is not aected by snapshot
size, but only by tree size (tree height, specically).
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Figure 11: Proof sizes (minimum, average, maximum)
in skip lists and RBB-Trees. (a) Proof size vs. distance
between the skip list proof end points. (b) Proof size vs.
RBB-Tree size.
Neither the traversed logical \shape" of the tree, nor
the distribution of keys into disk blocks are depen-
dent on how frequently a tree snapshot is archived.
Finally, we graph proof sizes in skip lists (Fig-
ure 11(a)) and RBB-Trees (Figure 11(b)). Both
graphs show proof sizes in KBytes, over 1,000 uni-
form random trials in a skip list of 100 million ele-
ments and an RBB-Tree of three million elements,
respectively. The skip list curve starts out as a reg-
ular square logarithmic curve, except for large dis-
tances, close to the size of the entire list. We con-
jecture that the reason for this exception is that for
random trials of distances close to the entire list size,
all randomly chosen proofs are worst-case proofs,
including every link of every level between source
and destination, although we must explore this ef-
fect further. The RBB-Tree graph shows a regular
logarithmic curve.
6.2 System Performance
Although microbenchmarks can be helpful in un-
derstanding how the basic blocks of Timeweave per-
form, they cannot give a complete picture of how the
system performs in action. For example, very rarely
does a Timeweave machine need to insert thousands
of elements into a skip list back-to-back. As a re-
sult, the disk block caching available to batched in-
sertions is not available for skip list usage patterns
exhibited by Timeweave. Similarly, most proof ex-
tractions in timelines only span short distances; for
one-second-long timeline time steps with one en-
tanglement process per peer every 10 minutes, a
Timeweave machine barely needs to traverse a dis-
tance of 10  60 = 600 elements to extract a prece-
dence proof, unlike the random trials measured in
Figure 9.
In this section we measure two performance met-15
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Figure 12: Timeweave performance for dierent
Timeweave loads. The errorbars show one standard
deviation around the average. (a) Time taken by
Timeweave maintenance per step. (b) Data sent per
time step.
rics of a Timeweave machine in action: mainte-
nance time and data transmitted. Timeweave main-
tenance consists of the dierent computations and
data manipulations performed to verify, archive and
acknowledge timeline threads. Transmitted data
consist of new outgoing threads to the peers of
the Timeweave machine and receipts for threads re-
ceived from those peers.
We measure the change of these two metrics as the
load of a Timeweave machine changes. The load of
a Timeweave machine is roughly the number of in-
coming threads it has to handle per time step. If we
x the duration of each time step to one second, and
the entanglement interval to 10 minutes (600 time
steps), then a load of 5 means that the entanglement
service set consists of 6005 = 3000 Timeweave ma-
chines and, as a result, every Timeweave machine
receives on average 5 threads per second.
Figure 12(a) shows the time it takes a single ma-
chine to perform Timeweave maintainance per one-
second-long time step. The almost perfectly linear
rate at which maintenance processing grows with
the ratio of threads per time step indicates that
all-to-all entanglement can scale to large entangled
service sets only by limiting the entanglement fre-
quency. However, for reasonably large service sets,
up to 1000 Timeweave machines for 10-minute en-
tanglement, maintenance costs range between 2 and
8% of the processing resources of a PC-grade server.
Figure 12(b) shows the amount of data sent per
time step from a single Timeweave machine. Al-
though the data rate itself is no cause for con-
cern, the number of dierent destinations for secure
transmissions could also limit how all-to-all entan-
glement scales. Again, for entangled service sets
and entanglement intervals that do not exceed two
or three threads per time step, Timeweave mainte-
nance should not pose a problem to a low-end server
with reasonable connectivity.
7 Conclusion
In this work we seek to extend the traditional idea
of time stamping into the concept of a secure time-
line, a tamper-evident historic record of the states
through which a system passed in its lifetime. Se-
cure timelines make it possible to reason about the
temporal ordering of system states in a provable
manner. We then proceed to dene timeline entan-
glement, a technique for creating undeniable tempo-
ral orderings across mutually distrustful service do-
mains. Finally, we design, describe the implementa-
tion of, and evaluate Timeweave, a prototype imple-
mentation of our timeline entanglement machinery,
based on two novel authenticated data structures:
append-only authenticated skip lists and disk-based,
persistent authenticated search trees. Our measure-
ments indicate that sizes of several hundred service
domains can be eciently entangled at a frequency
of once every ten minutes using Timeweave.
Although our constructs preserve the correctness
of temporal proofs, they are not complete, since
some events in a dishonest service domain can be
hidden from the timelines with which that domain
entangles (Section 4.3). We plan to alleviate this
shortcoming by employing a technique reminiscent
of the signed-messages solution to the traditional
Byzantine Generals problem [15]. Every time ser-
vice A sends a thread to peer B, it also piggybacks
all the signed threads of other services it has re-
ceived and archived since the last time it sent a
thread to B. In such a manner, a service will be able
to verify that all members of the entangled service
set have received the same, unique timeline authen-
ticator from every other service that it has received
and archived, verifying global historic integrity.
We also hope to migrate away from the all-
to-all entanglement model, by employing recently-
developed, highly scalable overlay architectures
such as CAN [22] and Chord [24]. In this way, a
service only entangles its timeline with its imme-
diate neighbors. Temporal proofs involving non-
neighboring service domains use transitive tempo-
ral mapping, over the routing path in the overlay,
perhaps choosing the route of least temporal loss.
Finally, we are working on a large scale dis-
tributed historic le system that enables the auto-
matic maintenance of temporal orderings among le
system operations across the entire system.16
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